Tanzania’s partnership landscape: Convergence and divergence in the wildlife sector

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Tanzania’s partnership landscape: Convergence and divergence in the wildlife sector

Christine Noe¹, Emmanuel Sulle² and Dan Brockington³

1 University of Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. Corresponding author. Email: cnpallangyo@gmail.com
2 University of the Western Cape, South Africa
3 University of Sheffield, UK

Abstract:
Tanzania’s endowment of diverse biodiversity, wildlife resources and prime natural attraction sites put the country at the center of many debates about conservation, human welfare and development. As approaches for wildlife protection have evolved over time, so has the need for redressing the gap between nature and people through different kinds of partnerships. Based on are view of the existing literature, we examine the context in which partnerships have emerged in the wildlife sector in Tanzania, the processes that support acquisition and maintenance of legitimacy, as well as the sustainability outcomes of these partnerships. Specifically, the paper examines the historical trajectory of these partnerships and the influence that different actors have historically maintained hence determining how the public and private sector engagements evolved over time. We draw insights from the Selous game reserve with specific attention to the role of Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) as a converging point for many actors. The paper suggests that partnerships for wildlife protection have increased in number and scope. However, the assessment of their impacts has mainly focused on how much land has been secured for the protection of wildlife. Livelihood impacts of these partnerships have been largely assessed against the background of unequal terms of local community engagement with private investors, recentralization, the rise of local elites, corruption and the limitations that they place on local land use. We suggest that documenting how partnerships are formed, their different configurations and impacts should be an important step towards the analysis of the relations of power among different actors and with local communities, as well as a nuanced understanding of their ecological and livelihood outcomes.

Key words: Sustainability, partnerships, Wildlife Management Areas, Selous game reserve, Tanzania
1. Introduction

This paper provides the context in which partnerships have emerged in Tanzania’s wildlife sector. It unpacks what these partnerships entail, the main actors behind their establishment and how they influence outcomes of different conservation and development initiatives. The paper is based on the review of literature with particular interest on recent sector reforms that have created conditions for the emergence of different kinds of partnerships. While we consider these partnerships as the result of decentralization of natural resources across developing countries, we use the Selous game reserve as a case study to illustrate some of their key features and dynamics. In the second section of the paper, we present the trajectory of partnerships in the wildlife sector in general and its manifestations in the Selous ecosystem. The third section examines how different and powerful global actors converged their interests to support construction of the Selous ecosystem as a landscape that is currently considered the largest game reserve in Africa. In the fourth section, we assess the role of different actors, particularly in supporting decentralization, which created the supporting legal and institutional framework for the establishment and functioning of WMAs as a form of partnership. The fifth and final section presents a critical review of socio-economic and ecological impacts of WMAs so far, with specific emphasis on the livelihoods of local communities.

2. The trajectory of wildlife conservation partnerships in Tanzania

In 2003, the Journal of Parks designated volume 13(1) specifically for conservation partnerships in Africa. Being the brainchild of the World Commission on Protected Areas (WCPA) of the World Conservation Union (IUCN), the focus on conservation partnerships in early 2003 was in the lead-up to the World Parks Congress in Durban in September of the same year. Six case studies in this volume dealt with partnership arrangements where biodiversity conservation and sustainable use of natural resources were a common thread. The term ‘partnership’ was loosely used to imply a collective, voluntary process and state of affairs by which a number of partners fairly shared the functions, rights and responsibilities for the conservation of a protected area and/or related territories and resources (Borrini-Feyerabend and Sandwith, 2003). It is noted that this understanding of partnership is far from idealized and can merely represent a complex interplay of interests. For the purpose of the initial discussions, however, it was fundamental in spelling out the broad understanding that sustaining conservation in Africa would require support of a variety of actors in society.
The literature on wildlife conservation partnerships in Africa is relatively new. However, conditions for the materialization of partnerships were created and embedded in colonial transitional strategies towards the independent Africa. Among other things, these conditions were to create continuity of influence and control by external actors on Africa’s wildlife (Gißibl, 2006). In Tanzania, this control and influence is entrenched in the famous Arusha Conservation Manifesto, the first post-colonial conservation commitment that continues to shape how bilateral development partners and international conservation organizations determine conservation priorities for the country’s vast natural resources. This historical commitment is important to bring forth in the discussions of the contemporary partnership configurations and impacts.

The need for partnership in Tanzania’s wildlife protection was demonstrated through the case of the Selous game reserve (SGR) for which Baldus et al., (2003) called for a multi-donor approach in protecting the landscape and its unique wildlife diversity. A detailed discussion of this case and how it shapes our conceptualization of conservation partnerships elsewhere in the country will follow later in the paper. For now, it suffices to point out that after two decades of the publication of conservation partnerships in Africa and the World Parks Congress, the questions that emerged from the selected cases remain relevant for our discussion today. However, instead of asking who possesses a social legitimacy to participate in managing the protected area and related natural resources (the overarching question of 2003), we examine the context in which partnerships have eventually emerged, the processes that support the acquisition and maintenance of legitimacy, as well as the sustainability outcomes of different emergent configurations. Our inquiry is against the background of two decades of nurturing these partnerships through state, local and international NGOs, community and private sector involvement in Tanzania’s wildlife sector.

In September 1961 – three months before the independence of Tanzania – a conference officially titled Pan-African Symposium of Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources in Modern African States was held in Arusha. The conference followed a report of inquiry¹ that led to the establishment of the African Special Project (ASP) (World Conservation Union (IUCN), 1963, Riney, 1970). The inquiry team worked from 1960 to 1963 by touring in almost all states in Africa south of the Sahara to discuss, with new and would be African leaders, the principles and practices of conservation. Whereas the report of this inquiry

¹The report was compiled by long serving African-based scientists, such as Prof. Julian Huxley (also the first director of UNESCO) and Mr. Gerald Watterson (the IUCN general secretary) (IUCN, 1963).
informed the Arusha conference, previous analyses have questioned the timing, motives of the conference organizers and the commitments made therein. It is argued that the inquiry report and the conference marked the peak of the conservation mission and the beginning of decolonizing nature in Africa (McCormick, 1989, Neumann, 1998, McShane, 2003).

While the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA) and IUCN were jointly responsible for the preparation of the Arusha conference, the American Conservation Association, Deutsche Afrika-Gesellschaft, the Fauna Preservation Society, the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland and UNESCO funded the participation of delegates from different parts of the world – about hundred and forty participants who represented African and non-African governments as well as international organizations (Noe, 2009). Among the top officials of the Tanzanian transitional government (then called Tanganyika) attending the conference was the then Prime Minister Mwalimu J.K Nyerere (Watterson, 1961).

The Tanganyika Governor Richard Turnbull presented the nature protection agenda under three main themes: (1) that wildlife and wild nature were an undoubted source of revenue needed for social services, and must therefore be rationally exploited as it is the best form of land use; (2) the public opinion, whose support was essential, must be convinced of the value of this heritage; and (3) the international aid would be needed if the world in general wished to see Africa’s unique fauna preserved in Africa for the benefit of humankind (IUCN, 1963). The culmination of the Arusha conference was the Manifesto, which was presented by the Prime Minister Mwalimu Nyerere. Indeed, an extract of the Arusha Manifesto as presented below echo legitimacy issues that the colonial government and conservationists wished to maintain:

*The survival of our wildlife is a matter of grave concern to all of us in Africa. These wild creatures amid the wild places they inhabit are not only important as a source of wonder and inspirations but are an integral part of our natural resources and of our future livelihood and well-being. In accepting the trusteeship of our wildlife, we solemnly declare that we will do everything in our power to make sure that our children’s grandchildren will be able to enjoy this rich and precious inheritance. The conservation of wildlife and wild places calls for specialist knowledge, trained manpower, and money. We look to other nations to co-operate with us in this important task, the success or failure of which not only affects the continent of Africa but the rest of the world as well* (cited in Watterson, 1961:4).
Through this manifesto, the Western influence over African wildlife was maintained over the newly independent government. Partnerships were tied to donor funds, which continued to support the presence of international development agencies and NGOs as well as bilateral institutions (Neumann, 1998, Kideghesho, 2006). As Bonner (1993) records, ‘the Arusha Manifesto was written by Europeans, including Max Nicholson, founding member of WWF, and Ian MacPhail, an advertising executive hired by WWF’ (p. 65).

Notwithstanding its origins, the manifesto served as a mantra that guided wildlife conservation in Tanzania before the enactment of the Wildlife Policy (1998). Its philosophy has been widely used by donors, conservationists and researchers to hold the government to its conservation commitment. Recently, the headquarters of Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) in Arusha was named after the late Mwalimu J.K Nyerere, and the Arusha Manifesto is inscribed in his statue which is placed at the center of the entrance lounge. At the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, the manifesto features in first pages of wildlife policies and strategies, and the text remains the basis of the government’s conservation commitments (United Republic of Tanzania (URT), 1998, TANAPA, 2009).

As Ponte et al., (2017) demonstrates, the contemporary partnerships that we study in the NEPSUS project is new in their context and process. Specifically, sustainability partnerships are taking shape as contexts of, and narratives about, resource depletion are changing - bringing new international audiences, alliances and policies to bear on previously local and national issues (Ponte et al., 2017). This implies that we must understand complexity in sustainability partnerships and how it may shape sustainability outcomes. Accordingly, NEPSUS examines whether and how different configurations of partnerships complexity lead to successful and more equitable outcomes, or to increased conflict and failure. This paper put partnerships in the wildlife sector in the overall context of the project urging further that, new partnerships have their genesis from the country’s colonial history of external influence in matters relating to wildlife. In our view, this history matter because it determines how various (old and new) partners have acquired and maintained legitimacy in the country’s conservation policy and practices.

3.The Selous ecosystem: Crisis narrative and conservation partnerships

Tanzania’s wildlife protected areas alone covers 26% of the country’s land surface with 15 national parks, the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, 28 game reserves and about 33 Game Controlled Areas (GCA) and/or Wildlife Management Areas (WMA). The latter
category was only formally designated in mid 2000s and covers about 5% of the total wildlife protected areas (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 2015). This protected area network is subsumed within six ecosystems across the country: the large Selous ecosystem, Tarangire-Manyara, Serengeti, Katavi-Rukwa, Moyowosi-Kigosi-Ruaha-Rungwa. The Selous ecosystem and its surroundings is an internationally significant area (hence, it has been a World Heritage Site since 1982). Its fame is connected to being the first and oldest reserve in Africa (since 1905); constituting the largest remaining elephant wilderness in the world (which is equivalent to the size of Switzerland); and being considered the best hunting destination in Africa (Baldus, 2001, Neumann, 2001). This ecosystem harbors about 60% of Tanzania’s elephant population (Baldus and Hahn, 2004).

In terms of landscape ecology, the Selous ecosystem covers 90,000 km² and includes the surrounding national parks of Ruaha and Mikumi, and several forest reserves, WMAs and open areas. Both WMAs and open areas are ‘unoccupied’ village lands adjacent to protected or conserved sites that are usually used by wildlife seasonally or throughout the year. As elsewhere in the country, connectivity of this ecosystem has been constructed through several WMAs such that the landscape is functionally linked with the 42,000 km² of Niassa game reserve in Mozambique (Noe, 2010). This connection scales up the ecosystem to a transfrontier conservation area, for which a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2007 between the governments of Tanzania and Mozambique.

Owing to its fame, the Selous game reserve has historically attracted many conservation and business partnerships, with the latter evoking narratives of environmental destruction hence calling for the participation of an increasing number of actors and actor categories. For example, in the mid 1980s, the Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS), a German NGO, claimed that the Selous reserve was in danger of losing its rhino and elephant populations and that, as a matter of urgency, Tanzania was required to approach the international community for assistance (Stephenson 1987). The Federal Republic of Germany responded in the same year, putting the SGR in its official development cooperation with the government of Tanzania. That same year, the Selous Conservation Program (SCP) was established as a partnership comprising Tanzania’s Wildlife Division and Germany Technical Cooperation (GTZ). Other partners such as Belgium Technical Cooperation (BTC) joined the mission with specific interest in supporting conservation activities in the eastern parts of the reserve.

For the first time, the GTZ/SCP and BTC-Eastern Selous programmes introduced community-based conservation in village lands around the reserve. By the year 2000,
about 51 villages in seven districts around the reserve had been involved in the conversion of village lands into some sort of wildlife buffer zones (GTZ, 1998, Baldus, 2008). These programmes significantly influenced the content of the first wildlife policy (1998), which became the cornerstone for the adoption of village wildlife areas known today as WMAs.

However, several crises emerged in recent years and have made Selous infamous in conservation cycles. These include threats to the reserve’s ecology from ongoing industrial projects – including uranium, oil and gas exploration, as well as the Stigler’s electricity generation project. The ecosystem has recently been the hotspot for poaching (UNESCO, 2015, WWF, 2016). Recent reports suggest that the Selous elephant population could disappear within six years if urgent measures are not taken to stop industrial-scale poaching (WWF, 2016). It is estimated that between 2009 and 2014, the population of approximately 45,000 elephants has declined to approximately 15,000 (URT, 2016). Due to these threats, the Selous game reserve was inscribed in the List of World Heritage Sites in Danger (IUCN, 2017). This called for more commitments to protect wildlife. As the following passage suggests, recent calls for partnership correspond closely with the country’s historical conservation mantra – the Arusha Manifesto – that had pledged for international assistance in wildlife protection:

_In light of huge challenges facing the Selous Game Reserve like poaching, encroachment and poverty in its buffer zones, but also in light of the significance of this magnificent and unique ecosystem of global importance, the German government is committed to supporting the Tanzanian government in protecting the Selous Game Reserve for the benefit of present mankind and future generations’ Egon Kochanke, German Ambassador to Tanzania (17 June 2017)._ 

This was the open statement of the joint press release at the launch of the Selous Ecosystem Conservation and Development Program (SECAD) in 2017. In the MoU, the German government announced the provision of €18 million for SECAD, to be implemented over a five-year time frame. Other co-financing and implementing partners, FZS and WWF committed approximately €400,000. As a powerful actor with involvement since the early times of SCP (URT, 2016), FZS is responsible for SECAD’s activities inside the game reserve in relation to supporting law enforcement, key species protection initiatives and ecological monitoring. WWF will advise the reserve management on outreach and community conservation, thus leading activities that are focused on the sustainable management of resources in priority areas around the reserve. According to
the joint release, an [unidentified] international implementing consultant will support SGR in the provision of priority infrastructure and equipment (URT, 2017a)

Beyond SECAD and its partners, there are other ongoing conservation commitments in and around the reserve. For example, Germany committed €100 million since 2012 for biodiversity protection and rural development in Tanzania. Out of these, €18 million were set aside for the rehabilitation of the SGR and its surroundings. Different German development agencies including FZS, KfW and GIZ are directly involved in the implementation of activities funded by these commitments. In a different joint press release of 31 March 2016, the Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Gerd Müller, provided funding for the acquisition of two Husky A-1C Aircraft to support the Tanzanian wildlife authorities in countering the poaching threat and monitoring wildlife and habitats. One of these aircraft was to join an earlier one that operates specifically in Selous under FSZ (URT, 31 March 2016). Hence, FZS operates the two aircraft for monitoring and logistics in addition to the provision of support for the maintenance of the Selous vehicle fleet.

Clearly, the German government has been historically a prominent bilateral partner with several of its agencies implementing different activities. However, other donors and international conservation NGOs (such as BTC, WWF, IUCN, UNESCO) have maintained strong connections to the SGR. Their activities in and around the reserve reconfigure local land use, natural resource institutions and relations. As such, these actors make WMAs (and village lands) a complex site for interrogating the newly emerging partnerships for wildlife protection. Against this background, we consider WMAs as both a product of the existing partnerships and a form of partnership that is characterized by a very complex network of actors who assume and maintain different roles and interests in wildlife. This complexity relates to the ecological importance of the SGR, which attracts the attention of powerful actors, but also to the WMA form, which dictates the nesting of local resources and their institutions into some sort of partnerships (between villages, with the game reserve/central government and with external conservation proponents). In the next section, we put into perspective the policy and legal environment through which different actors managed to converge their interests and actions that have significantly shaped access and control of land and its resources by the local communities.

4. Decentralizing the wildlife sector: legal and institutional framework

Responding to higher rates of wildlife poaching incidences in the late 1980s, the government of Tanzania, together with development partners, carried out major reforms
in the wildlife sector in the late 1990s (Nelson and Blomley, 2006, Nelson, 2012, Sulle and Banka, Forthcoming). Among other things, these reforms introduced the first Wildlife Policy of Tanzania (WPT), 1998, which formalized local community participation in the management, control and sharing of benefits from wildlife and other resources found within village lands (URT, 1998, Nelson and Blomley, 2006, URT, 2014a). In 2007, this policy was revised to recognize District Councils as responsible institutions for formulating and enforcing bylaws, providing technical support and conservation education to villages as well as preparing physical and development plans that protect wetlands and wildlife (URT 2007: Section 3.1.2). This policy further recognize villagers and private landholders as the key stakeholders who are bearing the costs of property damage by marauding animals and foregoing other social and cultural benefits (URT, 2007: Section 3.2.4 d).

These policy statements provide solid ground for villagers and district councils’ claims to have a large stake in conservation efforts and benefits. However, this has been one of the sources of struggle between local and the central government with the later maintaining its control and powers over the management of wildlife resources found in local jurisdictions. This is because; first, all wildlife is legally the property of the state making all activities pertaining to wildlife be authorized by the Director of Wildlife. Second, the district authorities are required by law support development and awareness in their jurisdiction (URT, 1982). This contradiction causes two opposing forces because district authorities have mandates for their development activities but not those to utilize resources to cater for the required financial and human resources. Nevertheless, reforms that occurred throughout 1990s were deemed necessary because policing of wildlife by the central government was no longer effective, and a collaborative model that would include local communities was regarded as essential.

The long-term goals of reforms in the wildlife sector targeted the improvement of the tourism industry. These interventions were meant to reverse the long-term decline in wildlife populations and ecosystems through increased engagement of key actors, and especially local communities, in the protection of wildlife. Consequently, conservation and tourism activities are administered at two levels of the government: the central government (i.e. Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT)) and the local government (i.e. the district council and its local authorities which include village councils and wildlife authorized associations) (Figure 1). The Ministry is responsible for policy formulation and overall administration and coordination of all activities related to the development of wildlife and tourism in the country. As indicated further in Appendix 1,
the Ministry uses several policies, legal and institutional frameworks to govern wildlife and tourism activities occurring in protected areas and village lands that support wildlife.

Governance reforms that shaped the institutional structure in Figure 1 were implemented at the same time as the World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes of the 1990s (Nelson et al., 2007, Noe and Kangalawe, 2015) which was expected to have two distinct outcomes in the wildlife sector. First, to increase domestic and foreign direct investment in wildlife tourism and, second, to cut down the costs of running the sector by eliminating redundant programs in various government agencies (Teskey and Hooper, 1999). The results of these interventions are yet to be fully realized mainly because several policies, legal and institutional frameworks have either been partially reformed or re-adjusted to institute more state control over natural resources that were previously sought to be decentralized (Benjaminsen et al., 2013, Ramutsindela and Noe, 2015, Wright, 2017). As such, there has been a continuous institutional struggle over who should control what resources in wildlife areas, especially those involving WMAs and/or open areas that are found in village lands.

**Figure 1: The Institutional Structure of Wildlife Governance in Tanzania**
Different studies provide reasons for the inadequacy of these reforms, including low capacity and lack of resources with which to address complex landscape management issues, the state’s continued control of wildlife revenues (Nelson and Agrawal, 2008), lack of transparency and accountability in revenue collection and sharing (Brockington, 2008, Wright, 2017), and lack of meaningful participation and empowerment of local communities (Mariki et al., 2015, Noe and Kangalawe, 2015). As a result, community participation in the wildlife sector either generates only limited benefits to rural livelihood or presents significant opportunity costs for local communities, further exacerbating land use and other natural resource use conflicts (Mariki et al., 2015, Bluwstein et al., 2016, Wright, 2017). This issue is at the heart of our current research because, as Nelson et al., (2007: 234) summarize:

‘the institutional reform of wildlife management in Tanzania as a response to changing policy, new narratives, and practical challenges in rural landscapes has proven to be fraught with tension and inconsistency. Conflicts over land and resource rights in areas where wildlife populations occur alongside local people have grown among government agencies, rural communities and private interests.’

5. Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs): An outcome of decentralization and a form of partnership

We make reference to WMAs ‘as an outcome because these areas emerged from a constellation of different actor’s diverse interests that converged to support policy and practices leading to a new conservation category in village lands. Through their financial and technical contributions, these actors have also participated directly in fostering partnerships between villages (that form WMAs) and between WMAs to establish wildlife corridors across borders. In doing so, these actors establish a local conservation scale necessary for the construction of conservation landscapes (Ramutsindela and Noe, 2015). WMAs are themselves a form of partnership between villages, protected area management and private sector actors who are involved in conservation business. In particular, local communities find themselves in this form of partnership by the sheer presence of protected areas in their neighborhood and by owning land that is considered valuable for wildlife.

Since wild animals do not recognize borders, their dispersal, rather than political jurisdictions, dictates conservation requirements. While this remains an ecological view, it renders village administrative borders immaterial hence requiring that villages agree to
put their land together and share responsibilities for wildlife protection. In addition, WMAs are brought into another level of partnership through an Authorized Association Consortium, a national level umbrella organization responsible for capacity building, marketing as well as bridging communities with the government, private investors and donors. In practice, this has meant that village lands are made available for the establishment of legal wildlife land use while at the same time creating buffer zones and wildlife corridors. Countrywide, there are 38 WMAs at different stages of development, of which 17 WMAs have attained AA status. Out of these, ten WMAs have been established in the wider Selous ecosystem (see Table 1). Their management plans include explicit interventions and activities that would strengthen the conservation of each of these areas and the reserve.

Conservation proponents have hailed WMAs as both a conservation tool and a legal mechanism for communities to benefit from their involvement in wildlife protection (WWF, 2014, Northern Tanzania Rangelands Initiative (NTRI), 2016). Benefits are projected in the form of revenues, employment, sales of goods, and other activities connected with tourism or trophy hunting. To generate benefits, WMAs that have registered Authorized Associations (AAs) (the governing body for WMAs) enter into joint ventures or concession agreements with tourism or trophy hunting companies - with the approval required from the Director of Wildlife. However, the procedures under the current WMA regulations (2012) require that the investors pay their fees directly to the Wildlife Division, with a proportion of wildlife income returned to the AAs following an agreed distribution formula.

Table 1: WMAs that form buffer zones and wildlife corridors in the Selous ecosystem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of WMA</th>
<th>Main funding partners</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIWALE</td>
<td>BTC</td>
<td>4,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUNGATA</td>
<td>GTZ, WWF</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKUTU</td>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILUMA</td>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBARANG’ANDU</td>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>2,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NALIKA</td>
<td>GEF/UNDP, GTZ, KfW, InWent,</td>
<td>1,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINGOLI</td>
<td>GEF/UNDP, GTZ, KfW, InWent,</td>
<td>938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KISUNGULE</td>
<td>GEF/UNDP, GTZ, KfW, InWent,</td>
<td>1,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KINDAMBA</td>
<td>GEF/UNDP, GTZ, KfW, InWent,</td>
<td>2,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUHIWANGUMWA</td>
<td>BTC</td>
<td>496.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total area under WMAs 15,066
6. Tourism-specific issues in WMAs

The world-class natural and cultural assets of the northern circuit that includes destinations like Ngorongoro conservation area, the Kilimanjaro Mountain and national parks such as Serengeti, Manyara, Tarangire and Arusha have mostly driven tourism growth in Tanzania. Following the concentration of national parks in the north, photographic tourism and their related economic multiplier effects are clustered in Arusha and Kilimanjaro regions. These regions account for the second highest concentration of accommodations, rooms, beds, and employees after Dar es Salaam. The tourism sector of Tanzania is still predominantly wildlife-based. The sector has a strong asset base (maybe one of the strongest in the region) but a weak tourism and institutional setup, which limits the generation, collection and distribution of benefits. Especially in relation to Southern Tanzania, the development of tourism businesses is constrained by issues related to security of tenure for investments in protected areas, infrastructure within tourist attractions, access by air, availability of skilled local labour and viable tourist products. Nevertheless, the contribution of tourism to the economy is significant. According to the Sector Report of 2014, tourism alone generated $2 billion in revenue, or 25% of total foreign exchange earnings and 17% of GDP (URT, 2014b). A recent SafariBookings analysis indicates that tourists and Africa experts voted Tanzania the best 2017 safari country in Africa (URT, 2017b).

While most of the tourism revenues are generated from activities that take place within national parks and game reserves, in recent years WMAs have contributed to these revenues through public-private partnerships and joint-venture investments. The 2012 WMAs guidelines provide for the partnership between investors and AAs. These legal provisions have facilitated the establishment of a variety of tourism initiatives in WMAs, including campsites, tented lodges and game drives among others. However, these regulations do not allow WMAs to make any agreements relating to consumptive use of wildlife (specifically, the allocation of hunting blocks) (Section VIII, 43 (1)). The guidelines are also specific in terms of revenue sharing among the four government institutions that have stake in WMAs. For instance, the division of revenues generated from tourist and resident hunting between the Wildlife Division² (now T, Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund (TWPF) Treasury, District Council and the WMA is as follows: (see Table 1).

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² Tanzania Wildlife Authority (TAWA)
### Table 2: Division of revenue generated from tourist hunting activities in the WMA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>s/n</th>
<th>Fee’s type</th>
<th>TWPF</th>
<th>WMA</th>
<th>District Council</th>
<th>Treasury</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Block fee</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Game fee</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Conservation fee</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Observers fee</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Permit fee</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: URT (2012) WMAs Regulations; pp. 65*

In the case of hunting practices as presented in Table 2, the AA consortium advertises hunting blocks in WMAs. However, before negotiating with potential investors, individual AAs are required to obtain the advice of the District Natural Resources Advisory Board and the proposed investors are also subject to approval by the Director of Wildlife. The reviewed regulations on non-consumptive tourism (2008) as well as the WMA regulations (2012) require that after the investors are identified by AAs, they deal directly with the Wildlife Division (currently the Tanzania Wildlife Authority (TAWA) after recent changes in wildlife administration) in all matters related to payment of fees and other requirements stipulated in different pieces of legislation.

In the case of photographic tourism, the regulation requires WMA to spend its total allocation of tourism revenue (which is 65% of total) in the following manner: no less than 15% shall be re-invested in resource development; no less than 50% shall be directed to member villages forming the WMA; and no less than 25% shall be used to strengthen the Authorized Association (AA). The AAs can use the remaining 10% as they deem fit – most of them invest in community development projects as opposed to investing in tourism-related business to regenerate profit. In the following section, we discuss the impact of these formulas on local community welfare.

### 7. Power, politics and the livelihood outcomes of WMAs

The politics of control and the impact of WMAs on livelihoods have been critically reviewed by many studies in Tanzania. Our review categorizes this literature around two broad themes: recentralization through decentralization; and prioritization of private investments over local community needs.
7.1 Recentralization through decentralization

As the government of Tanzania re-regulated activities in WMAs through its revised wildlife policy (2007), Wildlife Act (2009) and WMA regulations (2012), all tourist transactions were required to be channelled through the Wildlife Division (URT, 2007; 2012). These new laws foreclosed most opportunities that villages had enjoyed in relation to their direct engagement with private enterprises. The literature documents that the Wildlife Division has developed a command and control system that favours selected groups of hunting outfitters and has reduced income generation in rural communities who are the legitimate hunting holders of the land (Nshala, 1999, Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004). Other studies suggest that the system of revenue flow from tourists via private companies to the Wildlife Division is generally not known to the various actors who take part in the transactions, due to low levels of transparency coupled with corruption in the revenue collection and allocation system (Mariki et al., 2015, Bluwstein and Lund, 2016, Moyo et al., 2016).

The government control of revenue collection and allocation has caused resistance among outfitters to accept the WMA concept and effectively empower local communities. These outfitters have been more willing to deliver hand-outs to villagers than promoting productive cooperation with communities (Nshala, 1999). Against this background, critics have suggested that WMAs and tourism investments that are fostered within them are inherently territorial (Bluwstein and Lund, 2016, Bluwstein, 2017) and represent a form of green grabbing (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012, Green and Adams, 2015). The process that establishes these WMAs necessitates convergence of interests and funds from powerful global actors who engage actively in the re-organization of local space hence constraining local community choices for the use of land due to the prioritization of wildlife protection.

7.2 Prioritization of private investments over local community needs

The current official status of WMA was captured by WWF in 2014 (WWF, 2014). The report describes WMAs as ‘high-value industries with strong markets that rely on wildlife conservation’ (WWF, 2014: 17). This is despite the acknowledgement in the same report that most WMAs have negligible tourism revenue or none at all. While these low revenues are invested in community development (e.g. education, infrastructure and health facilities), WMAs do not necessarily know how much money they should receive. This lack of transparency makes it impossible for communities to demand a fair portion of benefits (WWF, 2014). Accordingly, Funk (2015) examined tourism and its potentials to improve...
livelihoods in Burunge WMA and found that revenues generated through tourism activities are substantial. Yet, the distribution and use of those financial resources do not allow villagers to be compensated for costs created by restricted resource access and human-wildlife-conflicts. Elsewhere in the country, villagers are increasingly becoming impatient with the lack of social benefits to individual households and even community (Noe and Kangalawe, 2015, PIMA, 2015, Moyo et al., 2016). Although it is not clear if food insecurity has increased, WMAs have exacerbated the intensity of human-wildlife conflict (Kapande, 2015). Damage is increasingly inflicted on crops, home-based food storage facilities, and water sources, while homes are raided causing loss of livestock as well as injuries and deaths of humans across the country (Vedeld et al., 2012, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 2015, Mariki et al., 2015).

Our discussion so far covered work on the recent dynamics in the wildlife sector in Tanzania generally, and on tourism development in WMAs. However, the question of the livelihood impacts of tourism has also been examined in academic studies (Nelson, 2010; Spenceley and Snyman, 2017; van der Duim et al., 2014) as well as impact and evaluation studies commissioned by the international donors supporting tourism partnerships (Elliot and Sumba, 2010). The conclusions of these studies are mixed, but what is generally clear is that community benefits from tourism are directly related to the share of revenue they receive from different partnership agreements and the additional income generated from providing ancillary services to tourism arrangements (as staff at eco-lodges, tour guides, etc.). Even when part of tourism revenues is received for community use and invested in building and maintaining schools, health clinics and other needed amenities, it is assumed that social and economic benefits are spread across community members (Elliot & Sumba., 2010; Lamers, Nthiga, van der Duim, & van Wijk, 2014; Mbaiwa & Stronza, 2010). Yet, corruption and local elites have often become the source of frustration for blocking the possible trickle-down effects of tourism (Mbilinyi et al., 2012). This has become a source of concern, as local community members continue to pursue their traditional livelihood activities with high level ecological stress despite the promise of conservation tourism (Burgoyne & Mearns, 2016). Indeed, community members have continued to practice farming as their main livelihood activity even when they have released large part of their land for developing tourism through WMAs. For this reason, wildlife in WMAs and village lands continues to compete with farming, hence causing frustration and despair for the loss of crops and increased food and other livelihood insecurities.
8. Ecological sustainability

The Wildlife Policy of Tanzania (2007) acknowledges that the wildlife sector is facing a number of problems, including persistent illegal harvesting of wildlife, low staff morale, limited human resources to carry out conservation activities, and low budgetary allocation for wildlife conservation at local government level (URT, 2007). As in many other African countries, these constraints are associated with the increased incidence of poaching in Tanzania, despite the heightened effort to develop community-based conservation in the past three decades.

In 2014, the Poverty and ecosystem service Impacts of Tanzania’s Wildlife Management Areas (PIMA) provided an assessment of the ecological and social-economic viability of WMAs. The project focused on benefits, costs, and their distribution between state, community and households. PIMA collected household-level information on wealth and livelihoods through surveys and wealth ranking exercises, supplemented with WMA- and village-level information on WMA governance, including revenue distribution. This information was gathered in 42 villages, both inside and outside six WMA areas, in Northern and Southern Tanzania (Homewood et al., 2015). The PIMA project combined socio-economic data with aerial surveys that were conducted in collaboration with TAWIRI, focusing mainly on WMAs. The analysis of aerial counts of wildlife population in the WMAs suggests that elephant carcasses counted in WMAs such as Makame (Longido district) and Liwale (Lindi district) exceeded live elephants spotted in those areas (Burgess et al., 2015). Although the study did not establish the cause of these deaths and the age of the carcasses, the timing of the survey was at the height of the poaching crisis in the country, with DNA evidence locating many seized tusks as coming from the Selous game reserve.

WWF (2016) suggests that WMAs have been an effective means of expanding area coverage for conservation beyond protected areas. The 17 WMAs that have either been registered or are in the advanced stage of registration represent land set aside for wildlife amounting to over 28,389 km² (WWF, 2014). This means that about three percent of village land that lies outside other kinds of protected areas has been secured for wildlife protection.³ Yet, WMA governance has also created conditions for further threats to wildlife because this expansion is associated with the extension of state control over village land rather than empowerment of local communities (Burgess et al., 2015, Homewood et al., 2015, Mariki et al., 2015, Wright, 2017). Most of local livelihood activities, including agriculture and grazing, have in part or fully been foreclosed resulting

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³ This percentage differs from the one reported in CITES (2016), which indicates 5%. This is most likely because it combines areas in WMAs and the Game Controlled Areas.
into conflicts and various kinds of livelihood impacts in the local communities (Bluwstein and Lund, 2016, Moyo et al., 2016). Wildlife protection and human livelihoods are therefore undermined by a combination of legal constraints of access and lack of compensation for loss, which create different kinds of local livelihood insecurities.

9. Conclusion

Through a review of the relevant literature, this paper has documented how partnerships for wildlife protection have emerged in the specific context of Tanzania, and the ecological and socio-economic impacts that these partnerships have had on ecosystems and communities. By highlighting the influence of specific global actors, including bilateral and development partners, the paper demonstrates how recent reforms in the wildlife sector created the conditions for partnerships to emerge. In our previous working paper, we suggested that conservation partnerships are tied to major global processes of scale construction, the creation of hybrid governance and the marketization of wildlife, which determine how biodiversity should be protected, governed and utilized (Noe et al., 2017a). The current paper provides a specific case of the ‘crisis’ narrative applied to the case of the Selous game reserve, and the subsequent protection efforts of an ecosystem that is currently the largest in size and among the best tourist destinations in Africa. These narratives inform global and national policies that formalize marketization of nature, hence calling for a diversity of actors.

We suggest that partnerships have emerged out of different processes that influence the convergence of interests of powerful actors whose actions meet on the ground, with various implications for both biodiversity and local livelihoods. In the case of Tanzania’s wildlife sector, partnerships have flourished and led to the establishment of WMAs as a focus for tourism enterprises. However, our review suggests that these partnerships are yet to have tangible impacts in on wildlife protection and local livelihoods. By becoming conservation partners, village councils have indeed contributed significantly to the expansion of wildlife-protected areas. Nevertheless, local livelihood strategies continue to be constrained by limited benefits due to tendencies of recentralization, the appropriation strategies of local elites, corruption and increasing limitations on land use. Greater community tolerance towards wildlife, and elephants in particular, can only be associated with the benefits arising from hunting and strong process-oriented commitments to community-based conservation, which is currently missing (CITES, 2015).
The paper contributes to the understanding of how wildlife protection partnerships in Tanzania have emerged over the years. It provides an important knowledge base on the country's experience in fostering different forms and configurations of wildlife protection partnerships generally and within the specific context of the Selous ecosystem and its surroundings. Our research thus contributes to the understanding of how these new partnerships are evolving overtime and more specifically, how villagers are coping with the changing meanings and institutions governing resources in their village lands, the emerging models of benefit and cost sharing and the ways in which conservation and livelihood outcomes are interpreted by different actors.

References


URT 2016. Joint Press release (31st March) by the Tanzanian Ministry for Natural Resources and Tourism, the Tanzania Wildlife Management Authority, the German Embassy Tanzania, and Frankfurt Zoological Society. Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism.
URT 2017a. Joint Press release (17th June) by the Tanzanian Ministry for Natural Resources and Tourism, the Tanzania Wildlife Management Authority, the German Embassy Tanzania, and Frankfurt Zoological Society. Dar es Salaam: Tanzanian Ministry for Natural Resources and Tourism,
URT. 2017b. Tanzania rated the Best Safari Country of 2017 in Africa. *17/7/2017*.
Appendix 1: Tanzania’s legal and policy framework on wildlife conservation

**Constitution**
- URT Constitution (1977) as amended

**Environmental Management Act 20 of 2004**

**Wildlife Conservation Act No. 5 of 2009**

**Ngorongoro Conservation Area Act (CAP 284 R.E. 2002)**

**Water Resources Management Act No 11 of 2009**

**Fisheries Act No. 22 of 2002 (CAP 279 R.E. 2002)**

**Forest Act No. 14 of 2002**

**Beekeeping Act No 15 2002**

**Tanzania National Parks Act (CAP 282 R.E. 2002)**

**The Marine Parks and Reserves Act, No 29 of 1994**

**Land Act, No 4 of 1999**

**Village Land Act, No 5 of 1999**

**Land Use Planning Act, No 6 of 2007**

**Tourism Act No. 29 of 2008**

**Tanzania Investment Act No. 26 of 1997**

**Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute No. 4 of 1980 & No 10 of 1999**

**College of African Wildlife Management (MWEKA) Act No 8 1964 CAP R.E.2002**

**Institute Act (CAP 277 R.E. Tanzania Wildlife Research)**

**Institute Act (CAP 280 R.E. Tanzania Wildlife Research)**

**District Authorities Act, No 9 of 1972**

**The Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act, No. 8 of 1982**

**Economic and Organized Crime Control Act, Cap 200**